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Prima facie, organizations have a peculiar, fragmented moral status. We can owe them 
some things. But we can’t owe them everything we can owe to people. Consider: 
 
Right to Vote: You’re an electoral commissioner, responsible for 
enfranchising the disenfranchised. One day an odd complaint, from 
Goldman Sachs, lands on your desk. “In 1920 the vote for women was 
secured. In the sixties the Voting Rights Act was passed. But we have not 
yet breached the final frontier of political equality!” You continue reading 
with interest. “Organizations throughout the land—corporations, colleges, 
clubs—are still denied suffrage. But we too have a moral right to set the 
laws we live under. Goldman demands a say about the general will!” 
 
The bank seems misguided. We owe it to our fellow citizens to grant them the power 
to vote. Our fellow citizens have a right to set the laws they live under. But 
organizations do not. In this respect, organizations are not at all like people. 
Similarly, consider: 
 
Right to Life: You’re Chief Justice Edward D. White. The issue of the 
day is whether to break up Standard Oil. The trust busters have put 
forward a good argument. They’ve told you about the firm’s ruthless 
history. They’ve told you how it bankrupted its competitors. They’ve told 
you how it won a stranglehold on oil production and then jacked up oil 
prices. But, in closing arguments, the representative for Standard Oil 
emits a surprising and impassioned plea. “I don’t deny my client has sharp 
elbows” he says. “But we would never end the existence of a human being 
merely due to their business acumen. Human beings have a moral right 
to life.” You listen bemusedly. “And so we should not end the existence 
of Standard Oil. It has rights like any flesh-and-blood person.”  
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The lawyer also seems misguided. We owe it to human beings not to end their 
existence. Human beings have an especially weighty right to life. But organizations 
do not. Perhaps we should not destroy them on a whim. But their inviolability is no 
momentous issue. In this respect too, organizations are not at all like people. 
But there are other respects in which organizations seem just like people. 
Consider: 
 
Promissory Claims: You just signed a contract with the University of 
Oxford. You promised it that you’ll set up a new graduate program by 
October. But you feel like it’s time for a holiday. By late September, you 
haven’t lifted a finger for the program. The university gets panned by the 
press. It is a complete embarrassment. How could such an august 
organization be taken in by a loafer like you? Soon enough, you receive a 
haranguing phone call from the Vice Chancellor: “We had a claim on you. 
Through your perfidious breach of your promise, you wronged our 
beloved university.” 
  
The Vice Chancellor seems right. It’s not just people to whom we have promissory 
obligations. We can make promises to organizations. When we break them, we seem 
to wrong the organization. In this respect, organizations are just like people. Both 
seem to be the bearers of promissory claims.  
Finally, consider:  
 
Claims of Gratitude: You’re a successful lawyer. You’re living the 
American dream. White picket fence, two kids, nosy neighbors, you name 
it: you’ve got it. But your life was not always so charmed. Your parents 
died in a terrible car accident in your early years. Fortunately, Galveston 
Orphans Home took you in. It gave you as good a childhood as possible 
in the circumstances. In fact, it gave you a wonderful childhood. Its 
ministrations are responsible for the success you’ve made of your life. 
But now the orphanage is in trouble. Its investments went sour, one thing 
lead to another, and it needs cash quick. So you receive a letter from it: 
“We know this is a little forward. But we ask you to consider helping the 
orphanage in these difficult times. We appeal to your sense of gratitude.” 
 
The letter seems warranted. It’s not just people to whom we can owe debts of 
gratitude. When organizations have helped us, we seem to owe them debts of 
gratitude too. In this respect too, organizations are just like people. Both seem to be 
the bearers of claims on our gratitude.  
So, prima facie, organizations have a peculiar, fragmented moral status. They can 
have certain claims on us, but not others. We seem to owe it to them to keep our 
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promises. We seem to owe them debts of gratitude. But they don’t have the rights 
to life people have. And they don’t have the full gamut of political rights. That seems 
mysterious. Why would anything (seem to) have such an eclectic collection of claims 
on us? This puzzle is the topic of this paper.  
Let’s get clearer on the puzzle. When we say that something has full moral 
status, we mean it can make the full range of moral claims on us. Any moral 
obligation we can have to a flesh-and-blood person we can have to that thing. When 
we say that something has a fragmented moral status, we mean it can make some, but 
only some, kinds of moral claims on us. Thus, we can have some, but only some, 
kinds of moral obligations towards it. These obligations don’t merely concern the 
thing. You can have obligations concerning your hat, but your hat doesn’t have 
moral status. They’re obligations to the thing. They’re directed obligations. We don’t 
have an account of what such obligations are. But, intuitively, there are directed 
obligations. Sometimes we don’t just have obligations tout court. We owe things to 
particular moral subjects.1 
When we say that something is an organization, we mean that it is a group 
agent. A group agent is an agent made up of other agents. Companies, states, clubs 
and charities can all be group agents. They’re agents in that they have beliefs, desires 
and intentions and those mental states are rationally integrated. When they want 
something, they’ll intend to do what they think is a necessary means to getting what 
they want. When they believe they ought to do something, they will form an 
intention to do it. Several authors have defended this way of thinking about 
organizations (see e.g. List & Pettit, 2011; Huebner, 2014; Tollefsen, 2015; Epstein, 
2015). It is now common. So we’ll presuppose that organizations are group agents 
for the rest of the paper. The puzzle is why such organizations appear to have a 
fragmented moral status.  
A good solution to this puzzle needn’t imply that organizations really do have 
fragmented moral status. Appearances, after all, can be misleading. But it must 
explain why organizations appear to have such an eclectic collection of claims on 
us. Two approaches to this seem natural: individualistic and collectivistic. 
Individualistic views explain these obligations entirely in terms of individualistic 
notions. These notions invoke only the features of flesh-and-blood individuals. 
They make no reference to organizations. We explore this approach in section 2. 
We think it fails. It doesn’t explain how our obligations to organizations seem to 
work. Collectivistic views explain these obligations entirely in terms of collective 
notions. These notions invoke only the features of organizations. They make no 
reference to flesh-and-blood individuals. We explore this approach in section 3. We 
think it also fails. No plausible theory of moral status can underpin such a view. 
 
1 See e.g. Darwall (2006), Owens (2012, ch. 2) or Wallace (2019) for prominent elaborations of this 
idea. 
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Thus, in section 4, we outline and defend a synthesis of these solutions. We call this 
the Group Interest View. This view says that some individual interests are 
distinctively collective. We, as individuals, have distinctive interests in participation 
in successful group agency. To properly respect this interest, we must treat 
organizations as if they had a peculiar, fragmented moral status. But in the final 
analysis the moral status of organizations is merely apparent: they themselves can 
make no claims on us at all. We must keep our promises to them and show them 
gratitude to respect the claims of their members. We think this is the best solution 
to the puzzle. In section 5, we end by discussing the implications of the Group 
Interest View for the apex organization: the state. The view undermines the political 
obligations of the subjects of autocracies, but leaves untouched those of the citizens 
of democracies. 
Our discussion contributes to several fields. First, it contributes to our 
understanding of the place of group agents in our moral life. It has been much 
discussed whether group agents are moral subjects—whether they are morally 
responsible or themselves have obligations (see e.g. List & Pettit, 2011; Hess, 2014). 
But it has been much less discussed whether group agents are moral objects—whether 
they can have claims or whether we can owe them things. Our discussion illuminates 
this issue.2 Second, our discussion matters to theories of moral status. We show that 
organizations provide an important test case for such theories; such theories better 
deal adequately with the case of organizations. Third, our discussion matters to 
theories of welfare. We show that organizations provide an important test case for 
these theories too. And, more substantively, we propose that welfare is in part 
constituted by group activity. Our puzzle thus implicates important parts of 





Let’s define an individualistic notion as a notion which makes no reference to 
organizations. It makes reference to flesh-and-blood individuals alone. 
Individualistic views attempt to explain the obligations in our opening cases purely 
by employing individualistic notions. We’ll focus on one view of this kind. We’ll call 
 
2 This issue hasn’t been wholly overlooked. Hess (2013) distinguishes between these two issues and 
suggests that corporations, at least, can make no moral claims. Wringe (2014) argues that 
organizations can’t have a claim against being treated as mere means. Raz (1984, 204) thinks that 
organizations can make moral claims but says little about why. List (2016, 315) addresses the issue 
very briefly. Briggs (2012) raises but doesn’t address it. Hedahl (2017) addresses it more extensively. 
List and Pettit (2011) explore whether and why we can have conventional (e.g. legal) obligations 
towards organizations. Note that we’re not addressing the rights of social groups—races, 
nationalities, genders (see e.g. Appiah, 2011). We’re interested in the rights of group agents. 
 5 
it Individualism. This view says that, when it seems we owe something to an 
organization we really just owe that very thing to one or more of its members.3 For 
example, suppose you had a good childhood in the Galveston Orphans Home. Well, 
then there must be some members of the orphanage who helped you. So it’s each 
of these members to whom you’ll owe a debt of gratitude. Similarly, suppose you 
signed a contract with Oxford to set up a graduate program. Then there must be a 
member of the university with whom you signed that contract. So it’s really just that 
member of the university to whom you have a promissory obligation. In neither 
case do you have an obligation in virtue of any feature of organizations. Thus, 
according to Individualism, our intuitions about organizations are misguided. But 
they’re misguided in an understandable way. We’re confusing an obligation to one 
or more members of an organization for that obligation to the organization itself.  
This view is neat and simple. But, unfortunately, it fails to explain how our 
obligations to organizations seem to work. We’ll note three problems for the view. 
The first problem concerns how such obligations are or aren’t transferred. This 
problem arises from the fact that organizations change their members. The people 
who made up Galveston Orphans Home when it benefited you might no longer 
make it up today. Those who made up Oxford when you signed your contract might 
have all fled the Oxford coop. In such cases, intuitively, many of our obligations 
stick with the organization. Even if their members have changed, you still owe 
gratitude to the orphanage. You still owe the fulfilment of your contract to the 
university. But, according to Individualism, all our obligations would stick with the 
original people. You have no reason to give anything to the orphanage. You have 
reason to help the social workers or administrators whom the orphanage employed. 
It’s they who benefited you. Similarly, you owe nothing to the university itself. You 
only owe something to its old members. It’s them to whom you have promised. In 
short, when organizations change their members, Individualism can’t explain why 
claims stick with the organization rather than move with the (former) members.  
The second problem concerns how the claims corresponding to these 
obligations are assumed. This problem arises from the fact that the members of 
organizations often don’t assume claims that match those obligations. Take 
gratitude. Plausibly, beneficence only generates a debt of gratitude when it goes 
 
3 There are other possible individualistic views. One alternative says that when we owe something to 
an organization, it’s really because of our own interests. Perhaps, for instance, we can have 
promissory obligations to an organization due to our interest in being able to bind ourselves. But this 
view strikes us as implausible. If it was our interest in self-binding that generated the obligation, then 
it would seem that it would be a duty that we owed to ourselves. Yet when you have a promissory 
obligation to an organization, the duty is not owed to yourself. It seems owed to the organization. 
So, in the text, we focus on views that invoke the members of organizations. Note that none of these 
‘individualistic views’ are views with existing advocates in the literature. They are just that views we 
regard as interesting individualistic approaches to our puzzle.  
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beyond the call of duty. If someone was obligated to benefit you, you don’t owe 
them gratitude.4,5 Suppose a horse you’ve bet on wins a race. It might be intelligible 
for you to thank the jockey. But the jockey has no claim on your gratitude. They were 
just doing their job. They were obliged to ride the horse hard. But members of 
organizations are often in the same position. The teachers and administrators of the 
orphanage might have been just doing their jobs. Their benefiting you may also have 
been well within the call of duty. So no member has done what’s needed to assume 
a claim of gratitude. Yet you still seem to owe the organization a debt of gratitude. 
A similar point goes for promises. Promises need uptake. Someone only has a 
promissory claim on you if they (or their agent) accepted a promise from you to 
them. When I accept your promise on behalf of my sister, you don’t owe me 
anything at all. You owe my sister what you promised. But there might be no 
member of the organization who’s accepted a promise to them. They might all think 
of themselves as having accepted a promise to the organization. So no member has 
done what’s needed to assume a promissory claim. But you still seem to be obliged 
to keep your promise. In short, Individualism can’t explain why the organization 
seems to have certain claims on you even when none of its members have assumed 
such claims.  
The third problem concerns how the obligations are discharged. It concerns how 
you can move from owing something to an organization to owing nothing to that 
organization. This problem has two aspects. On the one hand, there’s an issue of 
how we can fulfil these obligations. That means how we can successfully do what 
we’re obliged to do. Take debts of gratitude. We can fulfil such debts in many ways. 
We can avoid harming, and perhaps benefit, the person to whom we’re grateful. But 
if you owe this to the people that make up the orphanage, you can do this by 
benefiting them. You can buy them all flowers, or help their kids get to college. 
Plausibly, you should often do such things. But intuitively, when you benefited from 
an organization, that isn’t all you ought to do. You also ought to benefit the 
organization itself. On the other hand, there’s an issue of how we ought to 
compensate organizations for failures to fulfil our obligations. Take promissory 
 
4 This is the standard view in the literature; see e.g. Walker (1980, 48), Heyd (1982, 140), Weiss (1985, 
493) or Macnamara (2019). For people who deny this view, see e.g. Simmons (1979, 179ff.) or 
McConnell (1993, 16). 
5 One might think that this undermines the claim that you genuinely owe gratitude to the 
orphanage itself. After all, one might think, orphanages are obligated to look after orphans. Doing 
so is not beyond the call of duty for them. Perhaps, but we doubt orphanages are obligated to look 
after specific orphans. Their capacity is limited, so if the orphanage had taken in a different orphan 
to you, it would not have been doing anything wrong. Thus, we doubt this argument alone defeats 
the claim that people can owe gratitude to organizations. Having said that, our ultimate view 
(section 4) is that you don’t own genuine duties of gratitude to organizations. So even were this 
argument sound it would cohere well with our considered position.  
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obligations. When you fail to keep a promise, you have not discharged your 
promissory obligations. You should compensate the promisee for your failure. But 
suppose you owe your promise to the members of the University of Oxford. Then 
you should discharge this duty by making those members whole again. You could 
give them money individually, say, or stock up their private wine collections. But 
intuitively, that isn’t all you ought to do. You should compensate the university itself. 
In short, Individualism does not capture how we can discharge the obligations we 
seem to owe to organizations.  
Individualism is thus unsatisfactory. It fails to explain why many of your 
obligations seem to stick with the organization when its members change. It fails to 
explain why the organization seems to have a claim on you even when the members 
have not assumed such a claim. And it fails to explain why you only seem able to 
discharge your obligations to organizations in certain ways. So perhaps, to solve our 
puzzle, we do need to refer to the features of organizations. Perhaps these features 





Let’s define a collectivistic notion as a notion which makes no reference to flesh-and-
blood individuals. It makes reference to group agents, and their features, alone. 
Collectivism attempts to explain the obligations in our cases purely by employing 
collectivistic notions. In particular, Collectivism says that the features of 
organizations, together with the right general theory of moral status, explain why 
organizations have exactly the moral status they seem to have. We’ll consider two 
families of Collectivist view. These are distinguished by what theory of moral status 
they adopt. First, we’ll consider views which adopt a single source theory of moral 
status. These theories say that there’s some single property, F, the possession of 
which alone grounds the ability to make every kind of moral claim.6 Second, we’ll 
consider views which adopt a dual source theory of moral status. These theories say 
that the possession of one property, G, grounds the ability to make some claims and 
the possession of another property, H, grounds the ability to make distinct claims. 
Both families of views aim to vindicate our intuitions about organizations. Both 
families say that organizations have exactly the peculiar, fragmented moral status 
they seem to have. But we think each family is unhappy, albeit in its own way. So 
we doubt that Collectivism provides a good solution to our puzzle.  
We start with the first family. These views say that a single property grounds 
moral status and that organizations’ possession of this property explains their 
fragmented moral status. We think that any such view faces a general problem. 
 
6 The notion of ground in play is full ground. See Fine (2012, 50). 
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Single source theories tend to grant organizations full moral status or none at all. To 
see this, we’ll look at the two such theories most prominent in the Western 
philosophical tradition. The first says that agency is the source of all moral status. 
There are several ways to fill this out. For instance, perhaps rational agency is an 
end in itself that demands our respect. By breaking our promises to rational agents 
or by showing them ingratitude, we fail to respect their rational agency. Perhaps 
that’s why these things are wrong. Alternatively, perhaps what we owe to each other 
is set by the rules we’d agree to in some hypothetical position. Perhaps rational 
agency is the price of admission to that position. Only rational agents get a say in 
bargaining over moral norms. And perhaps such agents would reject norms on 
which we may break our promises to them or not show them gratitude. On either 
theory, rational agency is the fount of all directed obligations. One type of 
Collectivist view says that these theories can explain the fragmented moral status of 
organizations.  
Such views aren’t hopeless. After all, consider animals. Animals, arguably, have 
a fragmented moral status. You owe it to your dog not to kill it. But you don’t owe 
your dog the vote. Agential single source theories can tell a story about this. Killing 
your dog impairs its agency. But it can’t vote. So, disenfranchising it doesn’t impair 
its agency.7 Thus such theories can explain the fragmented moral status of some 
entities. And so perhaps they can explain that of organizations. But we doubt it. 
These theories might explain why we’d wrong an organization by breaking our 
promises to it or showing it ingratitude. Organizations are rational agents. Perhaps 
such behavior would impair their agency. Or perhaps they would reject norms that 
allowed us to treat them in this way. But such theories also imply that organizations 
have a right to the vote and a weighty right to life. After all, organizations are rational 
agents. Disenfranchising them and dissolving them impairs this agency. Keeping the 
vote from Goldman limits its political participation. Breaking up Standard Oil snuffs 
out its agency altogether. On the view under consideration, they have weighty claims 
against such impairments. Thus, they should have voting rights and a weighty right 
to life. So, agential single source theories give organizations all the claims that flesh-
and-blood people have.  
Let’s turn to a second single source theory. This theory says that welfare is the 
source of all moral status. There are, again, several ways to fill this out. For instance, 
perhaps if something harms you, we owe it to you not to do it. We owe it to people 
not to reduce their welfare. This aptly explains why you have full moral status. 
Ending your existence, disenfranchising you, breaking promises to you and not 
showing you gratitude all harm you. So you have a claim on us not to do these things. 
Alternatively, perhaps what matters is not whether an action actually harms you. 
Perhaps it is whether it tends to harm you. On this view, if an action is of a kind 
 
7 For a story a little like this, see Thomas (2016). 
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which tends to harm people, we owe it to each subject not to inflict it on them. So 
it matters not whether every promise-breaking or disenfranchisement damages 
welfare. What matters is that such acts tend to damage welfare. Another type of 
Collectivism says that these theories can explain the fragmented moral status of 
organizations.  
This again seems doubtful. The exact problem depends on whether 
organizations can have welfare. Suppose that they can have welfare. This could be 
because welfare consists in the satisfaction of desires and organizations can have 
their desires satisfied. If so, we could explain why you seem to wrong an 
organization when you break your promises to it or show it ingratitude. Doing so 
diminishes its welfare. But then you’ll also wrong organizations by denying them 
suffrage and ending their existence. Both seem likely to frustrate their desires, and 
so to diminish their welfare. So, in this case, organizations will have all the claims 
flesh-and-blood people have. Alternatively, suppose organizations cannot have 
welfare. This could be because having welfare requires phenomenal consciousness 
and organizations lack such consciousness. If so, we could explain why we don’t 
wrong organizations when we break them up or deny them suffrage. Since 
organizations can’t have a welfare, they don’t have claims against being broken up 
or denied suffrage. But organizations will lack all other claims too. For, if they can’t 
have welfare, breaking promises to them or showing them ingratitude cannot impair 
their welfare. Thus, in this case, organizations will have none of the claims flesh-
and-blood people have.  
So neither single source theory is of much use to Collectivism. They either give 
organizations full moral status, or none at all. Thus we turn to our second family of 
Collectivist views. These rely on dual source theories. On such theories, there are 
two ultimate sources of moral status. One property grounds political rights and the 
right to life. Another property grounds the ability to make promissory claims and 
claims of gratitude. The most natural such theory invokes welfare and agency. To 
aid Collectivism, it must say that welfare alone grounds rights to life and political 
rights whilst agency alone grounds claims to promise-keeping and gratitude. 
Collectivists can then claim that organizations lack welfare but have agency. They 
thus lack the right to life and political rights, but can make promissory claims and 
claims of gratitude. So this theory could vindicate our intuitions about the moral 
status of organizations. If it is true, then organizations might have exactly the 
fragmented status that they seem to have.  
Unfortunately, this theory is not plausible. For suppose our having agency 
grounds our ability to make promissory claims and claims of gratitude. Perhaps 
promise-breaking and ingratitude impair our ability to execute our rational choices. 
It thus disrespects our agency. But then surely ending our existence, or denying us 
the vote, also disrespects our agency. Ending our existence impairs this ability at 
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least as much as breaking promises to us does.8 Denying us the vote impairs it at 
least as much as does showing us ingratitude. So agency should ground these 
political rights and the right to life too. Rational agents should have these rights. Yet 
the theory in question denies this. It says that welfare alone grounds such rights. 
And it has to say that for it to aid Collectivism. Otherwise, organizations will have 
the rights that intuition denies them. They will have the right to life and to the vote. 
Thus, this theory seems ad hoc. It seems to have no principled reason for denying 
that agency grounds these rights. That makes it implausible. 
We suspect that this point generalizes. Collectivism needs a dual source theory 
on which one property, and that property alone, grounds claims to gratitude and 
promise-keeping. But another property, and that alone, grounds claims to political 
rights and the right to life. It can then hold that organizations have the first property 
but lack the second. But we suspect that any such theory will be implausible. Now 
we can’t fully substantiate this suspicion without going through every possible dual 
source theory. This is a Herculean task and, unfortunately, the blood of Greek deity 
does not course through our veins. But there is a general reason to hold it. If a 
property grounds one type of claim, there must be no in principle barrier to it 
grounding claims. Thus, it seems plausible that it can ground other types of claims. 
And our suspicion is validated by the most natural dual source theory: the one which 
invokes welfare and agency. So we doubt this second family of Collectivist views 
helps solve the puzzle. Thus, Collectivism seems in as bad a position as 
Individualism. Neither can explain the apparent moral status of organizations.  
 
 
4. The Group Interest View 
 
4.1. Our proposal 
 
We’ve seen that our puzzle can be easily solved neither by employing purely 
individualistic notions nor by employing purely collectivistic notions. But we think 
it can be solved nonetheless. The key is synthesis. We think that individuals have 
distinctive interests in collective actions. In particular, individuals have an interest in 
the participation in successful instances of group agency. But interests generally give 
rise to claims. And this distinctive interest gives rise to the claims by the members 
of organizations which match what we appear to owe to organizations. We’ll call 
 
8 One might deny that this is true of organizations, on the grounds that ending an organization’s 
existence is never to treat it as a mere means. But that seems false: if a private equity firm dissolves 
a business to make money selling off its component parts, it is surely treating the business as a mere 
means. It is not valuing the business in itself, but rather treating it as a means to make money. For 
more on this, see Wringe (2014).  
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this the Group Interest View. From Collectivism it borrows a focus on the 
distinctive features of organizations. From Individualism it borrows a focus on the 
moral features of the individuals in those organizations. On this view, to be clear, 
the apparent moral status of organizations is merely apparent: we don’t really owe 
organizations anything. But treating organizations as if they had a fragmented moral 
status respects the core interests of their members. Thus the nature of the 
obligations in our opening cases is unveiled. They’re obligations grounded in the 
distinctive interest in collective action.  
Let’s spell out the proposal in more depth. It is based on an interest theory of 
moral claims (see e.g. MacCormick, 1977; Raz, 1984; 1986; Kramer, 2001). As we’ll 
understand it, this theory says:  
 
Interest-Theory: A has a claim against B that B  if and only if A has a 
legitimate interest in B’s -ing that’s weighty enough to hold B under a 
duty to .  
 
We’ll start by clarifying terms. First, what’s an ‘interest’? We’ll say that A has an 
interest in B’s -ing if and only if B’s -ing would improve A’s welfare. It would, in 
other words, make A’s life better for A, or increase A’s well-being. Second 
clarification: when is an interest ‘legitimate’? An interest is legitimate only when your 
having it doesn’t violate an independent constraint. You might be a sadist. You 
might have a strong desire that others suffer. But you shouldn’t have such a desire. 
You should wish peace and love to all. So your interest in other people suffering is 
not a legitimate interest. Third, when is A’s legitimate interest in B’s -ing ‘weighty 
enough to hold B under a duty to ’? When it is much weightier than the legitimate, 
countervailing interests of others. You might have a legitimate interest in someone’s 
not applying for a job. But they’ll have a legitimate interest in applying. Your interest 
is rarely much weightier than their interest. So, this rarely gives you a claim that they 
do not apply. Your interests give you claims only when they greatly outweigh other 
people’s legitimate interests.  
We now make an important assumption. Organizations do not have welfare. 
They don’t have lives which can go better or worse in a morally significant way. 
We’re inclined to found this assumption on two further thoughts. First, 
organizations are not phenomenally conscious. There is nothing it is like to be 
Standard Oil.9 Second, phenomenal consciousness is necessary to welfare. If you 
aren’t conscious, then you don’t have welfare. This is true on several theories of 
welfare. The most well-known such theory is Hedonism. This says that pleasures 
and pains are the only states that contribute to welfare. These are phenomenal states. 
 
9 List (2016) defends this view. 
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Thus, only phenomenally conscious beings have welfare. But it’s also true on other, 
more attractive, theories of welfare. For example, suppose one thinks that personal 
relationships, knowledge and projects all enhance welfare, but only when you 
endorse having them. And suppose one thinks that endorsement is a phenomenal 
state.10 What it is to endorse a friendship is to feel positively towards it. On this view, 
perhaps you can have friendships you don’t feel positively towards. But they only 
enhance your welfare when you do feel positively towards them. So, again, only 
phenomenally conscious things have welfare. We think some such theory is true. 
These further thoughts imply that organizations don’t have welfare. 
We finally come to the crucial point: human beings have interests which 
implicate group agents. Here we’re taking our cues from an old master. As Aristotle 
knew, we have an interest in doing things, and doing them well (see e.g. 1999, 
1097b22-1098a20). People have an interest in running restaurants, building 
buildings, cultivating crops. And they have an interest in doings these things with 
aplomb. As Aristotle knew too, we also have an interest in associating with others (see 
e.g. 2017, 1253a1-3; 1999, 1097b11, 1169b17). People have an interest in being with 
their friends, colleagues, even strangers. Aristotle didn’t combine his two insights.11 
But, very plausibly, we have an interest which combines the two. We have an interest 
in doing things well together with others. People don’t just have an interest in running a 
good restaurant and another interest in being with their friends. They also have an 
interest in running a successful restaurant with their friends. This is an interest in 
playing a role in a group agent. We’ll call it an ‘interest in participation in successful 
group agency’.  
Let us be clear about the nature of this interest. It is not simply an interest in 
collaborating with others. It is perhaps not satisfied by going on a walk with a new 
friend. Rather, it is an interest in participation in group agency. We think that there 
is a distinctive interest in such participation because group agency is especially 
valuable. It is an especially impressive sort of agency. This is because group agents 
can be much more complex and sophisticated than flesh-and-blood agents. They 
can assimilate vastly more information, they can have far more complicated  a 
structure of intentions and their actions are often on a much grander scale. No flesh-
and-blood individual can do the kinds of things that Standard Oil can do. None can 
even do what an orphanage can do: nobody could care for thousands of orphans 
over the course of a century. This elevated sort of agency is especially valuable, in 
the sense that the Grand Canyon or the Mona Lisa is valuable. It need not be good 
for anyone, but it is valuable in itself. Now the key further thought is that we have 
an interest in participating in valuable things. We, for example, have an interest in 
participating in valuable projects or performances or practices. So, we have an 
 
10 This is a twist on the view in Bykvist (2006). 
11 Although he came close. See e.g. (2019, 488a7-14). 
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interest in participating in successful group agency. This is an interest in participating 
in an especially valuable kind of thing: group agency. Note that, in characterizing 
this interest, we’re not employing purely individualistic notions. A view that invokes 
this interest is thus not an individualistic view: it synthesizes such views with 
collectivistic ones. It hinges on a distinctively collective interest of individuals: 
participation in group agency.  
We want to clarify some more things about this interest. First, what is it to 
participate in group agency? It is for your actions to in part constitute the group’s 
exercise of agency. This is done when your actions play a role in the group’s 
decision-making: perhaps your vote in a committee determines what your restaurant 
group decides to do. And it is also done when your actions play a key role in the 
execution of those decisions: perhaps you are the chef who actually makes the 
restaurant’s meals. In both cases, your actions constitute a group agent’s exercise of 
agency. Second, when exactly is such participation good for you? We don’t think 
every instance of participation in group agency is personally valuable. Imagine that 
you are forced into such participation; you might be an enslaved chef, forced to 
labor reluctantly in the kitchens. Your cooking still helps to constitute the 
restaurant’s provision of meals. But this kind of participation does not seem good 
for you. The lesson here, we think, is that participation in group agency is only good 
for you when it is endorsed. You have to affirm your participation in group agency, 
to participate willingly, in order for that participation to have value for you. Thus, 
those forced into such participation typically won’t garner value from it.  
Let us make one final clarificatory point. We think that people’s interest in 
successful participation in group agency is the one most directly, deeply and 
repeatedly impacted by how we act towards organizations. That is not to deny that 
other interests are impacted by such actions: of course they are. Rather, it is to say 
that the group interest is almost always implicated, and often very substantially so. 
It is this interest, we think, that explains the apparently fragmented moral status of 
organizations. So, let’s now apply this collection of claims—the Group Interest 
View—to the cases which make up our puzzle. 
 
4.2. Our cases reconsidered 
 
We start with political participation. Here we want to explain why we needn’t give 
organizations the vote. The key point is that organizations don’t themselves have an 
interest in getting the vote. This turns on the assumption we just made about 
welfare. Goldman Sachs has no welfare. So giving it the vote cannot promote its 
interests; it doesn’t have any interests to promote. Now, of course, it has ‘interests’ 
in some sense. But this is the same sense in which plants have an interest in good 
lighting. It is not the sense that matters to moral claims. Thus, Goldman has no 
prima facie claim to voting rights. Now you as an individual may have an interest in 
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your organization getting the vote. Perhaps you’re an executive at Goldman. You 
think the laws treat banks harshly. You’d like your bank to get a vote on those laws. 
But this interest won’t give you a claim that your group agent be given the vote. 
That’s because we all have a strong interest in you not getting an extra vote for your 
organization. For suppose group agents did all get the vote. This would distort 
policymaking further in the direction of what such groups want. So your interest in 
your group getting the vote is outweighed by the rest of our interests in groups not 
getting the vote. Thus, we have no obligation to enfranchise Goldman Sachs.  
Now let’s turn to the right to life. Here we want to explain why we needn’t treat 
organizations as if they had weighty rights to life. The key point is similar: 
organizations don’t themselves have an interest in their own continuation. Again, 
that turns on our assumption about welfare; Standard Oil has no welfare. So it has 
no interest in its own continued existence. Compare that to John D. Rockefeller. He 
has welfare. So he has an interest in his continued existence. This is why Rockefeller 
has a right to life but Standard Oil does not. Now some people do have an interest 
in the continuation of Standard Oil. Perhaps Rockefeller had an interest in Standard 
Oil staying together. The corporation was his grand project. And everyone has an 
interest in the success of their projects. But other stakeholders have a weighty 
interest in breaking up Standard Oil. Its competitors have an interest in not being 
underhandedly forced out of business. Consumers have an interest in not paying 
over the odds for oil. These interests outweigh Rockefeller’s interest in Standard 
Oil’s continuation. They’d be less weighty than Rockefeller’s interest in his own 
continued existence. That’s why we can’t break up John D. Rockefeller himself. But 
they’re weightier than his interest in the company’s continued existence. So, we are 
obliged to avoid ending Rockefeller’s existence but not Standard Oil’s. 
Let’s now turn to promise-breaking. Here we want to explain why we ought to 
keep the promises we make to organizations. The key point is that you can thwart 
others’ interest in collective action by breaking your promises to their group agents. 
This is because we have an interest in taking part in instances of successful group 
agency. We have an interest in doing things well with others. But you tend to frustrate 
this interest when you break promises to a group agent of which we’re a part. Agents, 
generally, can only act successfully when they can rely on their expectations. By 
making and breaking a promise to a group agent, you ensure that it can’t rely on its 
expectations. This impairs its ability to act successfully. So you thwart individuals’ 
interests in participation in successful group agency. Consider the University of 
Oxford. When you break your promise to the university, you impair its ability to act 
successfully. So you thwart the interests of its members in playing a role in successful 
group actions. Typically, this interest of the members outweighs your interest in 
making and breaking a promise to the organization. So, when you promise 
something to an organization, you have an obligation to keep that promise. The 
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interest the members of that organization have in it being able to rely on its 
expectations grounds this obligation. 
Finally, we turn to gratitude. Here we want to explain why you seem to have 
debts of gratitude to organizations which have benefited you. Let’s first consider the 
interests of members of such organizations. They have an interest in your helping 
out the organization. This is because that helping out usually helps them take part 
in a successful case of group agency. But consider your own interests. If you don’t 
want to help out the organization, then you usually have an interest in not helping 
it out. Helping out is usually costly. If you don’t want to incur that cost, then you 
have an interest in not helping out. When the organization has never benefited you, 
this provides a counterweight to the interests of the members of that organization. 
Your interest in not donating to, for example, the DMV outweighs the interests of 
the DMV’s employees in you donating. But we doubt that this interest provides a 
counterweight when the organization has benefited you. This is because, in such 
cases, you should want to help out the organization. This makes your interest in not 
doing so illegitimate. But it is only legitimate interests which get placed on the scales 
of the interest theory of claims. Thus, in these cases, the interests of the members 
are not outweighed. They have a claim on you to help their organization do well. 
The crucial premise here is that your interest in not helping out certain 
organizations is illegitimate. This premise relies on a principle about what you should 
want. The principle, roughly, says that when something valuable has played a 
valuable role in your life, you have weighty reason to want that thing to do well.12 
One should understand that valuable role as non-accidentally linked to the value of 
the thing itself. Consider the beauty of the Grand Canyon. Contemplating this 
beauty improves your life. But that improvement is not accidentally related to the 
Grand Canyon’s value. The improvement is caused by, and a manifestation of, the 
Grand Canyon’s beauty. Thus, when you’ve contemplated the Grand Canyon’s 
beauty, you have weighty reason to want it to escape despoliation. This point 
extends to other cases. Suppose you’ve benefited from the tradition of Zen 
meditation, a profound novel, a hale horse. And suppose the benefit is non-
accidentally linked to what makes each thing valuable. Then you have reason to want 
them to flourish. You should want the great Zen tradition to escape 
commercialization, the novel bastardization, the horse the glue factory. Thus, to 
state the principle more precisely: when the value of something non-accidentally 
benefits you, this gives you weighty reason to want the thing to retain those valuable 
properties.  
 
12 Cf. ‘Participation in a valuable relationship is a source of relationship-dependent reasons’ 
(Scheffler, 2018, 5). Here, Scheffler is saying that being valuably involved with people gives you special 
reasons for action. Our claim is similar in spirit. We’re saying that being valuably involved with things 
gives you special reasons for desire. 
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We can apply this principle to organizations. When the value of an organization 
non-accidentally benefits you, you have weighty reason to want it to keep its valuable 
properties. This is why your interest in not helping out certain organizations falls 
short of legitimacy. You only have that interest because you violate this independent 
constraint. You lack a desire, to help them out, that you ought to have. Let’s see 
how this applies to Galveston Orphans Home. The members of the home have an 
interest in you giving it money. And the orphanage’s value—the fact that it helps 
children—benefited you non-accidentally. After all, the whole raison d’être of the 
orphanage is to help out orphans like you. So you should want to give the orphanage 
money; this will help preserve its good features. So your interest in not giving the 
orphanage money doesn’t offset the members’ interests in your doing so. So the 
members of the orphanage have a claim on you that you help stop it going under. 
This is why it seems you owe things to the orphanage.  
That completes our application of the Group Interest View to our cases. We 
now want to clarify two further things about our position. For a start, we’re not 
saying that every obligation loosely connected with organizations should be 
explained via reference to the interest in participation in successful group agency. 
We think that you can have more straightforward obligations to the members of 
groups. Consider gratitude: we think that, often, you will owe gratitude to those in 
an organization who have helped you. Sometimes, this debt of gratitude may 
outweigh any reason to help out the organization. If you have to choose between 
helping one of your flesh-and-blood benefactors, and helping the organization, 
often you should help the former. But we deny that such individualistic duties 
exhaust your obligations around organizations. We defended that denial in section 
2: some of your duties seem owed to the orphanage, rather than to any of its 
members. We think that to explain these duties one needs to invoke the interest in 
participation in successful group agency. We will show how to do so in the next 
section. 
Let’s consider one further idea to drive this point home. Some might think that, 
intuitively speaking, the reason you should give money to the orphanage is that you 
should “pay it forward.” The idea is that, generally speaking, when you receive some 
benefit you have a duty to give others a like benefit in turn. You received a benefit 
from the orphanage—your good upbringing—and so you should give other orphans 
a good upbringing. Again, we don’t deny that this is part of the story. Perhaps there 
is such a sui generis duty to pay forward your benefits, and perhaps that explains some 
of your obligations in the orphanage case. But this doesn’t exhaust your obligations 
in these cases. The simplest thing it fails to capture is that you could discharge this 
“paying it forward” duty by supporting any orphanage whatsoever. You could give 
money to an orphanage in New York or Dallas, or even one across the street from 
that which took you in. Yet other things equal, you should benefit the orphanage 
that raised you, not any orphanage whatsoever. If your obligations all derived from 
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a simple duty to pay forward your good fortune, there seems to be no reason why 
this would be the case. So, this view doesn’t fully capture our obligations around 
organizations. To fully capture these obligations, we think that one has to employ 
the Group Interest View.13  
We want to clarify a final point. We’ve shown how the Group Interest View 
can make sense of our seeming debts of gratitude and promissory obligations to 
organizations. But we seem to have duties of many other sorts to organizations. The 
Group Interest View illuminates these cases too. We’ll just give three examples. 
First, consider organizational break-up. Although organizations lack a weighty right 
to life, it is wrong to break them up for little reason. We might permissibly break up 
Standard Oil, but we shouldn’t break up Nike. Second, consider lying. It is wrong 
to lie to organizations. It would be wrong to mislead Nike about the size of the 
sneaker market in Suriname. Third, consider property. It is wrong to steal from 
organizations. Nike owns the shoes in its stores: you may only take them if it gives 
you permission to do so. So, it would be wrong to shoplift from Nike. Each of these 
things can be explained by the Group Interest View. Breaking up an organization, 
lying to it, or stealing from it, all impair its ability to act successfully. They all impair 
its agency. The members of the organization, the employees and shareholders, have 
an interest in participation in that agency. So these actions contravene the 
distinctively collective interests of each member. That is why they are wrong. Our 
general point here is that we seem to owe much more to organizations than just 
gratitude and the fulfillment of promises. A great virtue of the Group Interest View 
is that it can explain all these further apparent obligations too.  
 
4.3. Our worries overcome 
 
Let’s turn to the special features of our obligations to organizations. In particular 
let’s turn to those features that Individualism couldn’t explain: the transfer, 
discharge and assumption of these obligations. In this section, we will show how 
the Group Interest View can explain these features. 
We’ll start with transference. The problem here was that organizations can 
change their members. But many of your obligations seem to stick with the 
organizations rather than the members. This is exactly what the Group Interest View 
predicts. Let’s first see this with obligations of gratitude. Galveston Orphans Home 
 
13 We wish to stress here that, on the Group Interest View, the interests of those served by an 
organization do nonetheless play a role in capturing these obligations. The orphanage, for example, 
is valuable in part because its actions satisfy current orphans’ interests. It’s this value, and its non-
accidental connection to your life, that explains why you have weighty reason to want the orphanage 
to do well. And that delegitimizes your interest in not helping out the orphanage. So, the interests of 
the orphans are key in giving you a duty to help the orphanage.  
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benefited you. So you don’t have a fully legitimate interest in not benefiting it. And 
the new social workers and administrators have an interest in you benefiting it. So 
you owe it to them to give back to the orphanage. Your obligation doesn’t stick with 
the old employees. It remains stuck to Galveston Orphans Home. Now turn to 
promissory obligations. You’ve promised the University of Oxford to set up a 
graduate program. You’ll thwart the university’s agency by not lifting a finger. But 
the new members have a legitimate interest in the successful agency of Oxford. So 
they have a legitimate interest in your keeping your promise. So you owe it to them 
to set up the graduate program. Your obligation does not stick with the old 
employees. It remains stuck to the university.  
Now consider the assumption of the claims corresponding to obligations. The 
problem here was that the members of organizations needn’t assume claims of 
gratitude or promissory claims. They needn’t incur any special sacrifice when 
benefiting you. They needn’t take up your promise to the organization as if it was a 
promise to them. But you should pay your debts of gratitude and keep your promises 
all the same. The Group Interest View gets this right too. On this view, your 
obligations in these cases aren’t really like comparable obligations to individual 
people. They have a different basis: they’re grounded in the interest in participation 
in successful group agency. Thus, the members of the organizations needn’t do 
what’s needed to assume promissory claims or claims of gratitude. They need just 
assume the claims grounded in their interest in participating in group agency. And 
they assume these claims merely by willingly participating in the relevant group 
agent. So they do everything they need to assume the claims that the Group Interest 
View says that they have.  
Finally, consider the discharge of your obligations towards organizations. One 
aspect of this problem was that it seems you have to fulfil your obligations as if you 
owed them to the organization. A second was that, when you fail to fulfil them, you 
seem to have to compensate the organization itself. The Group Interest View gels 
with both. Let’s start with the first aspect. The key point here is that the interests 
that ground your obligation are the interests of the members that you benefit their 
organization. They aren’t interests that you benefit them. So, donating money to the 
orphanage is a way of fulfilling the obligation grounded by these interests. But 
buying those individuals flowers isn’t. Now turn to compensation. The key point 
here is that what makes for appropriate compensation is keyed to what interest you 
thwarted. The thwarted interest was in taking part in a particular instance of 
successful group agency. The best way to promote this interest will, usually, be to 
help out the agency of the relevant group agent. So this is what you should do. Take 
the promise to the university. You’ve impaired the agency of Oxford by breaking 
your promise. This impairs the interest of the university’s members in participating 
in the university’s agency. But those interests are not best made whole by giving 
each member a little money. They’re best made whole by compensating the 
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university itself. This will increase the university’s ability to manage its own affairs. 
So it will promote exactly the interest that you thwarted. So, the most appropriate 
compensation goes to the university. It does not go to the members of the 
university. 
The Group Interest View thus provides a good solution to our puzzle. It says 
that organizations seem to have fragmented moral status, because acting as if they 
have such status is the best way to respect the distinctively collective interests of 
individuals. Now we haven’t provided a full defense of this view. Most importantly, 
we haven’t provided a defense of the interest theory of moral claims. And we don’t 
intend to. This is a well-known theory with well-known problems.14 The jury is still 
out on whether such problems can be solved—or swallowed. If they cannot, the 
Group Interest View will go down with the interest theory of moral claims. But we 
wish to note that even if the interest theory is sunk, the spirit of the Group Interest 
View may be salvageable. That spirit is that important moral features of individuals 
implicate important features of collectives. This can be incorporated into other 
accounts of moral claims. Consider, for instance, theories which understand moral 
claims in terms of autonomy. On these theories, we have a claim that others don’t, 
without good reason, infringe our autonomy. This gives us claims against promise-
breaking, ingratitude, disenfranchisement and termination. All infringe our 
autonomy without good reason. Now suppose that we don’t merely have an interest 
in participation in successful group agency. Suppose that it infringes our autonomy 
when people hinder the functioning of a group agent in which we play a part. This 
would also explain the apparently fragmented moral status of organizations. 
Breaking promises to organizations and showing them ingratitude will hinder their 
members’ participation in successful group agency, and so infringe their autonomy. 
When done without good reason, this will give those members a claim against such 
infringements. Now denying organizations the vote, or breaking up monopolists, 
will also infringe that autonomy. But there is good reason to do both. So, these 
infringements will ground no claims. The Group Interest View is, we think, a better 
solution to our puzzle than this autonomy-based view. But the point is that the spirit 
of the view can survive the death of its letter. 
Let us address one final issue with the Group Interest View. One might worry 
that the view makes our obligations surrounding organizations too similar to those 
surrounding more informal associations. To get a grip on the worry, imagine that 
you’re an anime fan. You might meet up with other anime fans to celebrate Spirited 
Away together. The fandom is an informal association. The worry is that there is, 
intuitively speaking, a substantial asymmetry between our apparent obligations to 
the fandom and our apparent obligations to a university or a business. We seem to 
owe much more to the latter kind of thing than the former. Yet we said in section 
 
14 See Sreenivasan (2005, 261-65) for some examples. 
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4.1 that we have an interest in doing things well together with others. And surely 
you can do things well together with your fellow fans. So, on the face of it, it seems 
that the Group Interest View implies that there is no such asymmetry between 
structured organizations and informal associations. And that, one might worry, 
makes the view untenable. It fails to capture something intuitively distinctive about 
organizations.  
We want to make several points in reply to this worry. For a start, we don’t 
think that, intuitively speaking, there is that deep an asymmetry between our 
obligations around the two kinds of associations. In particular, we don’t think that 
we never seem to owe anything to informal associations. This comes out most 
clearly in the case of gratitude. It seems to us perfectly plausible that there is something 
like gratitude that one can owe to informal associations. You can feel grateful for 
the good times the fandom provided you, and this gratefulness can translate into a 
felt debt to the fandom. There isn’t much difference between a fandom and an 
orphanage in this respect. Now, it is more plausible that there is a deep asymmetry 
between informal associations and formal organizations when it comes to promises: 
perhaps you should keep your promises to a university, but it is not clear whether 
you can be obligated to keep promises to a fandom. Yet this specific asymmetry has 
a reasonably straightforward explanation. It requires a certain level of cognitive 
sophistication to be able to accept a promise. Fandoms don’t have that level of 
sophistication. But a promise can only be made to something that can accept it. So, 
we lack duties to keep promises to fandoms simply because we cannot make 
promises to fandoms. So, intuitively speaking, the asymmetry between structured 
organizations and informal associations is usually shallow. And when it is deep, as 
in the case of promises, it can be explained straightforwardly.  
Yet there is some difference between informal associations and structured 
organizations. Typically, when we seem to have duties to both, those to the former 
seem weightier. But this is explained nicely by the Group Interest View. The key 
point is that the interest at the heart of this view is not simply that of collaborating 
with others. As we said in section 4.1, it is an interest in the successful participation 
in group agency. Now one’s anime fandom certainly involves some sort of 
collaboration. But one might doubt that the fandom is an agent at all. So one might 
deny that participating in it helps in the slightest to satisfy the distinctive interest in 
participation in successful group agency. But even if one, more concessively, allows 
that such a fandom might be an agent, it is a simpler and far less impressive instance 
of group agency than is that of Standard Oil. It has far less intricate attitudes and 
can do much less than a structured organization, precisely because of its relative 
informality. Qua agent, it is closer to a hummingbird than to a human being. 
Accordingly, participating in the fandom (and other informal associations) will not 
be as valuable as participating in more structured organizations. So, our obligations 
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surrounding structured organizations will be weightier. That, we think, fully captures 
any real asymmetry between formal organizations and informal associations. 
 
5. Political Obligations  
 
We’ve presented an account of the moral patiency of organizations. On our view, 
they don’t really have any moral status. But, often, the distinctively collective 
interests of individuals mean we must, in some respects, act as if they do. In this 
final section, we wish to explore the implications of this view for our political 
obligations. Or, to put it another way, we want to explore how our view impacts 
what we owe to the apex organization: the state.  
Many theories of political obligations say that we owe things to the state. For 
example, consider the actual consent theory. On this view, we’ve actually promised 
to do as our political obligations oblige. For instance, we’ve promised to obey the 
law. On the main contemporary version of this theory, this promise is owed to the 
state (Beran, 1987, 31). Yet, if the state cannot have promissory claims, then this 
theory cannot be right. The state is not the kind of thing to which one can owe the 
fulfilment of promises. Or consider gratitude theories.15 These theories point out 
that the state has done great good for us. It has educated us, protected us, clothed 
us, housed us. Our political obligations are just consequent debts of gratitude to the 
state. But, if we can’t owe the state gratitude, then this theory also cannot be right. 
The state is not the kind of thing to which we can have such debts. So the view 
we’ve presented imperils these theories of political obligations. Now, we don’t claim 
it imperils every theory of political obligations. But it contradicts every theory which 
assumes that we can owe things to the state itself. And that makes up an important 
class of theories of political obligations.  
But what the Group Interest View takes away with one hand it giveth with the 
other. It highlights a route out of the peril. In many states, ordinary citizens 
participate in state action. They vote. They petition. They protest. This often affects 
what their state does. So, it helps fulfil these citizens’ interest in participation in 
group agency.16 And it helps fulfil that interest in a particularly spectacular way. State 
 
15 Plato discusses this theory in his Crito (2002, 48d-52d). Walker (1988) is its main modern advocate. 
16 On this view, the state’s members include its citizens. Lawford-Smith (2019, 31–68) argues that 
such a state is only a group agent in a weak sense. We wish to make two brief points about this. First, 
her arguments mainly target the idea that the plurality of citizens are a group agent in any strong sense. 
We think that the plurality of citizens, together with the officials and the organizations that they’re 
embedded within, are the relevant agent. We ourselves think many of her objections don’t apply to 
this more inclusive, more structured, thing: it may be a group agent in a strong sense. Second, we 
think group agency in the weak sense is quite adequate for our purposes. We have interests in 
participation in these sort of group agents too, and that interest could explain our political obligations 
in a democracy.  
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actions are awesome in both scope and aim. They’re vaster in impact than most 
organizations’ acts. And they do, or can, have distinctively political aims: to achieve 
a society in which all are truly free and equal. Thus, these ordinary citizens have a 
claim that you keep your promises to the state and pay it your debts of gratitude. 
This claim is grounded in their interest in participation in successful group agency. 
So, promissory and gratitude theories of political obligations can and should be re-
conceived. They shouldn’t hold that you owe your political obligations to the state. 
They should instead hold that you owe these obligations to the ordinary citizens of 
those states. The point generalizes to other theories of political obligations. 
Generally, these theories should not say that political obligations are owed to the 
state. They should say that they’re owed to the members of that state.  
But this is a route only some states can take. Ordinary citizens don’t properly 
participate in the actions of all states. They only properly participate in the actions 
of democratic states. Thus breaking your promise to the Chinese state does not 
thwart the distinctively collective interests of ordinary Chinese citizens. They have 
little role in the group agency made manifest by the Chinese state. Now, of course, 
some people—party cadres—do have such a role. But, in this case, their interest in 
successful group agency is illegitimate. We think it is anyway. We think that Chinese 
citizens have a right to self-determination. The heavy hand of the Communist Party 
violates this right. Thus, the route out of peril which the Group Interest View 
highlights is available to democratic states alone. No legitimate interests bind you to 
keep your promises or pay back your debts of gratitude to the Chinese state. The 
substantive upshot of this is important and plausible: the subjects of autocracies are 
less likely to have political obligations than are the citizens of democracies. 
Let us look at an objection to this conclusion. One might think that the citizens 
of autocracies do participate in the agency of their states. Now, unlike democratic 
citizens, they don’t participate in their state’s decision-making. But they participate 
in executing its decisions. This is clearest in the context of mass mobilization 
campaigns. During the Great Leap Forward, for example, the Chinese state decided 
to increase steel production. It mobilized Chinese citizens to melt down their pots 
and pans in backyard blast furnaces. The hope was that this would produce steel 
that could be used in industry.17 Those citizens, the thought goes, had the same role 
low-level employees have in firms. They executed their organization’s actions. So, 
just like employees, they participated in group agency. The objection says that there 
is not an important difference between this sort of participation and that democratic 
citizens enjoy. So, if political obligations in democracies might be owed to citizens 
of those democracies, political obligations in autocracies might be owed to subjects 
of those autocracies.  
 
17 For more on this episode, see MacFarquhar (1983, 113–16). 
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We think this objection is misguided. There are two, complementary, points to 
make in reply to it. First, in section 4 we claimed that, in order for participation in 
group agency to be valuable for someone, that person has to willingly participate in 
that group agency. Those who are forced to participate in such agency, and thereby 
do not endorse that participation, fail to benefit from it. Now employees of 
companies typically do willingly participate in their organization’s agency. They have 
exit options: they can leave and work for another company if they want to do so. 
But that isn’t the case for many citizens mobilized by an autocracy, or at least not 
the kind of autocracy that has existed up to now. Chinese citizens typically can’t 
freely leave China, and nor can they remain but spurn the state’s directives. If they 
do so, they risk severe reprisals. So, when they participate in the agency of the 
Chinese state, we suspect they often do so unwillingly.18 Thus, such participation is 
not good for them. Our second point concerns citizens for whom this isn’t true. 
Some citizens of autocracies participate with gusto: they throw themselves into the 
campaigns started by the state. They do endorse their participation. So perhaps these 
citizens get some value from that participation. But, in this case, the point we just 
made about officials of the state applies. Just like officials, these citizens don’t have 
a legitimate interest in participation in an autocratic state. This is, again, because 
their fellow citizens have a prior right to self-determination. So the participatory 
interests of such citizens, those who endorse the autocracy, cannot undergird 
political obligations in their states. So no, or very few, legitimate interests are served 
by participation in the group agency of an autocratic state.  
Thus, we conclude that the citizens of democracies are more likely to have 
political obligations than are those of autocracies. We regard this as a plausible 






Let’s end with the words of another. Hubert Humphrey, in July 1948, said that the 
time had finally come for the Democratic party to ‘get out of the shadow of states’ 
rights and to walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights.’ He went 
on to add that ‘[p]eople—human beings—this is the issue...’. We think that 
 
18 For first-person accounts of mass mobilization campaigns during Maoist China, see Yiwu (2009). 
Such accounts ground our suspicion that endorsement of such campaigns was less than universal 
among ordinary citizens. Of course, ordinary citizens are often very outwardly enthusiastic about 
mass mobilization campaigns in autocratic states. But such outward expressions of enthusiasm are 
likely motivated by the desire to avoid reprisals. For more discussion of this dynamic, see Marquez 
(2017, 131–35).  
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Humphrey’s point was, in part, that it is wrong to think that states have rights. We 
have not put the point so beautifully, and our cause is nowhere near as noble. Yet 
we agree with Humphrey. We think that organizations generally don’t have rights. 
They don’t have any moral status whatsoever. But we have added a minor point of 
clarification. Although human beings are the issue, human beings do have 
distinctively collective interests. And these, often, give them claims that mimic those 
that organizations would have, had they moral status. Now, this clarification does 
nothing to support the position against which Humphrey was remonstrating. But it 
does suffice, we think, to explain why, prima facie, organizations have a peculiar, 
fragmented moral status.  
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